

Role of Communities in Preserving Political Identities: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Poland

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Abstract

We leverage a quasi-experiment of history to examine how much preservation of community bonds matters for successful long-term transmission of historical identities. After World War II, ethnic Poles from western Ukraine were forcibly resettled to western Poland. In an arbitrary process, some forced migrants settled in their new villages as a majority group, preserving their communal ties, while others ended up in minority. We fielded an original survey to compare respondents in majority and minority villages in the present. We find that descendants of migrants in majority settlements are considerably more likely to exhibit traits associated with the historical Polish identity in western Ukraine. This finding suggests an important corrective to the way we think about identity transmission. We demonstrate that families are best able to transmit historically-rooted norms and identities when community bonds remain intact.

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1 Introduction

There is a growing consensus across the social sciences that political norms and identities have enormous staying power, outlasting the formal institutions and historical events that had shaped them. Established findings on persistence of partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Wittenberg 2006), religious views (Myers 1996) and civic traditions (Putnam 1993) are joined by recent evidence on persistence of victim identities (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017), risk and trust attitudes (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011), outgroup hostility (Charnysh 2015; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016), gender norms (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013), and attitudes toward corruption (Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002). Some norms – notably those connected to civicism (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2016) and intergroup relations (Voigtländer and Voth 2012) – are purported to have persisted for over half a millenium, transmitted from one generation to the next.

But what do we actually know about the processes by which identities and norms persist? When a family that has nurtured a particular set of strong political identities across multiple generations is deracinated, do its members continue to maintain the historically-rooted identities or do they assimilate to views dominant in their new communities? The standard though rarely tested assumption in much of this literature is that the family plays a crucial role in transmitting identities and norms. Yet, the theoretical literature from evolutionary biology (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981) and economics (Bisin and Verdier 2001) suggests that preservation of community bonds that bind like-minded families either significantly facilitates persistence or is a requirement for it. There is support for this theoretical proposition in the fledgling empirical literature on migrant assimilation (e.g. Barni et al. 2014).

In this paper, we ask what role the preservation of community bonds plays in the process of transmission and persistence of historical identities and norms.¹ An answer to this question would help to improve our understanding of the conditions under which cultural identities persist and perish. It would also strengthen the overall research agenda on cultural legacies, which appears

¹We define community as an agglomeration of family units that have resided for multiple generations in the same historically distinctive region.

to be suffering from a credibility problem, given that the mechanisms behind persistence remain underspecified. Empirically, an examination of persistence mechanisms contributes to the study of processes by which migrants, both domestic and cross-national, assimilate and would allow us to better predict under what conditions assimilation is not to be expected.

It is no easy task to study the role of communities in the persistence of cultural identities because families usually select into like-minded communities. This creates a problem of endogeneity whereby the influence of family is impossible to disentangle from that of community. In an ideal scenario, we would have similar families distributed at random among settlements where a majority of residents share their culture and settlements where only a minority of residents come from the same cultural background.

This paper leverages a natural experiment of history that closely approximates this ideal design. In the immediate aftermath of World War II (WWII), Poland's borders shifted westward, precipitating population transfers on a massive scale. Ethnic Poles residing in provinces annexed by the Soviet Union were forced to resettle to the territories that Poland newly acquired from defeated Germany. The nature of the resettlement process was highly haphazard: whether families from the same settlement of origin or broader historical region were able to settle together at their destination depended on such arbitrary factors as the availability of space on trains at their origin, the coupling and decoupling of rail cars en route, the duration and itinerary of the trip, and the availability of houses in settlements at disembarkation points upon arrival. Post-war political imperatives – taking swift ownership of historically German lands while accommodating millions of Poles fleeing Soviet repression and ethnic cleansing – as well as administrative realities – the inability of Polish authorities to effectively prepare for and manage the resettlement process – meant that some migrants wound up in a majority in their new communities, whereas others ended up in a minority, outnumbered by migrants from other, culturally distinct regions. While family units were typically preserved intact in the resettlement process, migrants from the same village or region were often placed in divergent cultural environments, and the character of their new settlement – majority or minority – was largely due to chance. As we document using historical census and

voting data, whether migrant families were resettled to the same village as others from their region was orthogonal to their personal preferences or to the characteristics of their places of origin.

To track persistence of historical political identities across time as a product of preservation of community structures, we need a community of Poles with a well-developed political identity prior to resettlement. There is a consensus in the secondary literature that Poles who resided in the historical region of Galicia – now split between western Ukraine and southeastern Poland – are an ideal community in this regard (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Zarycki 2015). Between 1772 and 1918 Poland had been divided between Austrian and Russian empires and Prussia. Galicia was in the Austrian partition. Austrian authorities encouraged education in Polish, allowed Poles to run the regional government, and facilitated the expressions of Polish patriotism and celebration of Polish culture and religious traditions. Poles in the Austro-Hungarian empire also acquired extensive experience with democratic elections and were able to vote for Polish ethnic parties and candidates. In contrast, Russian and Prussian officials variously suppressed Polish-language schooling, barred Poles from holding positions in local administration, and were distrustful of manifestations of Polishness in religious and political spheres. As a result, by 1918 Poles of Austrian Galicia were more patriotic, politically active, and religious than their brethren under Russian and Prussian control (Wandycz 1974; Davies 2005). These traits have persisted into the present. There is a scholarly consensus that, today, Poles who reside in the territory of the former Austrian partition are more patriotic, religious, and politically engaged than Poles in other parts of the country (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Zarycki 2015; Bukowski 2018).

We focus on migrants who were forcibly relocated from eastern Galicia to southwestern Poland. If preservation of community bonds is a necessary condition for persistence of political identities, then we should observe that descendants of Galician Poles who ended up in settlements where migrants from Galicia were a majority are today more likely to exhibit attributes associated with the Austro-Hungarian rule than their brethren who ended up a minority in their new settlements after the war. To test this hypothesis, we collected historical data on the village-level distribution of migrants in Silesia and fielded a survey of 600 descendants of first-generation Galician migrants

in 61 uprooted villages, sampling an equal number of villages where migrants from Galicia dominated and villages where they were a minority. For comparison purposes, we also surveyed 100 respondents in ten Galician villages that are located just east of the 1945 Polish-Ukrainian border and thus were not subjected to resettlement.

We find that respondents who reside in villages dominated by Galician migrants are today considerably more religious and patriotic and more likely to turn out to vote than respondents in minority Galician settlements. We show that differences in the persistence of Galician political identity cannot be explained by prewar socio-economic differences of either origin or destination villages and remain visible when controlling for the origin of migrants' maternal and paternal grandparents and various demographic characteristics. Respondents in majority and minority settlements are very similar on cultural traits unrelated to the legacies of Austrian rule in Galicia, which suggests that our results are due to differential rates of intergenerational persistence of historical political norms across majority and minority communities rather than some other factor.

These findings suggest that intergenerational transmission of political identities is considerably more effective when families that share a common culture are settled together. This implies that major demographic disturbances or population movements weaken the transmission of historically-rooted behavioral norms. At a higher level, this study – to the best of our knowledge, the first to test the importance of social environment for identity transmission in a quasi-experimental setting – introduces community as an important mechanism for transmission of norms alongside families. By showing that the absence of community reinforcement for two to three generations suffices to induce cultural change we also offer an important correction to the predominant understanding of cultural transmission in the literature: parental socialization alone cannot explain the persistence of identities and norms over a very long run.

Empirically, we contribute to the literatures on conditions for migrant assimilation (Barni et al. 2014; Fouka 2018) and the legacies of forced displacement (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Braun and Mahmoud 2014; Becker et al. 2018). We leverage the same natural experiment of history as Becker et al. (2018), who compare investment in human capital by forced migrants from the territories

annexed by the Soviet Union to that of voluntary migrants from Central Poland, but focus on the mechanisms by which the forcibly resettled Poles preserve their cultural traits.

2 Understanding mechanisms of persistence

There is a substantial and growing literature across the social sciences on persistence of political identities and norms, in some instances even after formal institutions that had given rise to these identities and norms had long disappeared (for a review see Nunn 2014). This literature includes studies on persistence of civicism (Putnam 1993; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2016), trust and risk attitudes (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Dohmen et al. 2012), attitudes toward corruption (Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002; Simpson 2017), likelihood of engaging in protests (Lawrence 2017), victim identities (Balcells 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017; Dinas and Fouka 2018), outgroup prejudice (Voigtländer and Voth 2012; Charnysh 2015; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016), religiosity (Myers 1996; Bengtson et al. 2009), and partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Wittenberg 2006; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009).

All of these studies evoke intergenerational transmission of cultural traits to explain the remarkable continuities between contemporary outcomes and historical antecedents. However, few provide evidence on the mechanisms by which historical practices persist into the present (cf. Wittenberg 2006; Peisakhin 2015; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017). By default, the family is presumed to be the dominant, if not the only, transmission channel (e.g., Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013). This approach is deeply problematic. Theoretical literature in biology and psychology — which provides the foundations for the accounts of intergenerational cultural transmission — suggests that both family and community are vital to transmission of norms and identities. In a seminal study on cultural transmission, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) hypothesized that there exist three different types of cultural replication: vertical (from parent to offspring), horizontal (from peer to peer), and oblique (from a member of the older generation, like a teacher, to an unrelated member of the younger generation). Two of these three

mechanisms — horizontal and oblique — concern community-level processes. In explaining the puzzling persistence of norms, Boyd and Richerson (1985) noted that individuals are subject to conformity and prestige biases within their communities: a psychic need to hold the same views as the majority and a desire to emulate high-status individuals. The presence of conformity and prestige biases operating at community level should be expected to severely undermine parents' ability to transmit their culture, as stipulated by Bisin and Verdier (2001), who argue that parents must work a lot harder to socialize their offspring in their own image when embedded in communities that hold a different set of values. To fill the empirical lacuna on mechanisms of identity transmission this paper proposes a test of the community mechanism.

3 Context

3.1 Causes of forced resettlement

At the end of WWII, the Soviet Union annexed a substantial segment of interwar Poland – equivalent to 45% of pre-war Polish territory (see Figure 1). The post-1945 Polish-Soviet border largely followed the Curzon line, drawn up at the end of WWI as a proposed boundary to separate areas with ethnic Polish majorities to the west from those with ethnic Lithuanian, Belarusian, or Ukrainian majorities to the east. As compensation for the losses of eastern territories, Poland received 101,000 square kilometers of former German lands, including parts of Eastern Prussia and the former free city of Danzig/Gdańsk.

Stalin was keen to establish states dominated by titular ethnic majorities in order to minimize the likelihood of possible internal conflicts. A decision was made to implement mass population transfers: ethnic Germans were expelled from former German and Prussian territories, and ethnic Poles were moved from Soviet territories, where they comprised a substantial minority, into newly reconfigured Poland. Over five million Poles were resettled from the territories annexed by the Soviet Union and from other parts of Poland into lands newly acquired from Germany.

This paper focuses on Polish migrants from the historical region of Galicia, which now straddles the Polish-Ukrainian border. Having lived under Austro-Hungarian rule, they developed a

Figure 1: Changes to Poland's territory in 1945.



distinctive set of cultural traits prior to resettlement. These migrants also represent the largest culturally homogeneous group resettled to the formerly German territories. Focusing on this group also minimizes concerns about selection into resettlement: not only were they forced to relocate following the shift in international borders, but their exodus was nearly universal: some 95.6% of ethnic Poles from this region were registered for repatriation (Czerniakiewicz 1987).

3.2 Process of forced resettlement

At the heart of our research design is the notion that the process of resettlement from western Ukraine was quasi-random and that otherwise similar families found themselves in different types of communities for reasons that are unrelated to their prior political attitudes or social preferences. There is strong support for this notion in the historical record. Political expediency, limited state capacity after a devastating war, and the sheer vastness of the task all resulted in a highly disorganized resettlement process with little attention spared to community settlement patterns. Historians have described this process variously as "total chaos" (Kersten 2001, 83), "fail[ure of] coordination between officials" (Kochanowski 2001, 143), and something that "serve[d] only the aim of territorial appropriation, with little regard to optimizing settlement patterns" (Thum 2011, 59).

The political climate dictated that the resettlement proceed with utmost expediency and haste. The Soviet government and its clients in Poland wanted to present the international community with a *fait accompli*, in case Western allies changed their minds about the wisdom of annexing territory from Germany (Thum 2011). There was insufficient administrative capacity or time to micromanage settlement patterns as Poles from Central Poland and the Soviet borderlands poured into formerly German settlements almost simultaneously. Those coming from the Soviet Union traveled along one of the three major railways running along the east-west axis from Soviet territory (see Appendix Figure A.1). Poles traveling from western Ukraine boarded along the southernmost route running from Lwów and Rawa Ruska in Galicia to Opole and Wrocław in Silesia (Śląsk). Migrants were permitted to bring some personal items and a small amount of cash; the lucky few brought a farm animal. Many arrived empty-handed, having left in a hurry, been robbed, or been forced to trade their belongings on a journey that took an average of three weeks (Kosiński 1960).

Polish families departing from their homes in western Ukraine were instructed to present themselves at the nearest railway station. Whether they boarded the train with other families from their own or neighboring settlements depended on which families were at the station at the time of embarkation and the availability of space on the train. The population of villages was split into several transports, which departed several weeks or even months apart. There were no departure or arrival

schedules or pre-advertised itineraries, and the initial wait for embarkation could be as long as 10-15 days (Kulczycki 2003; Sula 2002). Once on the train, migrants were at the mercy of the vagaries of an immediate post-war railway system that prioritized the movement of Soviet troops and suffered from poor management (Kochanowski 2001).

In theory, migrants were supposed to be dropped off at specific locations that were sometimes written in chalk on the side of railway carriages. In practice, they were often unloaded in the middle of fields or at stations deemed convenient by train conductors. Kochanowski (2001) writes that "particularly in 1945, no arrangements were made for the expellees after they had arrived in the western territories" (145). As a result, "sometimes where the transported ended up was a matter of pure chance" (Thum 2011, 68). State Repatriation Office (PUR) Director Władysław Wolski lamented that migrants were often offloaded partway to their destinations, in the middle of an open field, because conductors were not issued route plans (Ciesielski 2000).

As forced migrants weaved their way to southwestern Poland, the German population was being evicted, and voluntary migrants from areas in central Poland neighboring on newly acquired territories also streamed into the former German settlements. This further complicated the settlement dynamics for resettlers from Ukraine. By the time forced resettlers had disembarked, voluntary migrants had already settled some villages. In other villages, only a few houses were available due to wartime damage, while, in some cases, whole villages still remained unpopulated. To complicate matters further, not all German-era inhabitants had been expelled; those claiming Polish or mixed descent were permitted to remain and held onto their property. Notably, officials in charge of resettlement did not have the most up-to-date information about the dynamics on the ground (Kochanowski 2001). As a result, once off the train, migrants were frequently sent from one destination to another when it turned out that officials had incorrect information about the availability of housing. It was not uncommon for groups of friends or neighbors or even family members to get separated at this stage, even if they succeeded in boarding the same train from the USSR. In a representative account, Marian Samulewski (n.d) described the tribulations of his Galician village community in western Poland as follows: "We were told our trip was over [...] but

there were no more empty houses in Wierzhówo, so only 3-4 families were able to settle there.” Samulweski’s family stayed put in Wierzhówo; others continued on their journey.

Once a family had located a house, it was very unlikely to move to try and reunite with former neighbors and friends from Galicia. Initially, there was too much uncertainty as to whether accommodation would be available in some other settlement. Migrants also felt like expropriators of German property and right away attempted to solidify their possession rights by obtaining land titles from the state. Once the initial settlement period had passed, self-sorting into village communities became difficult administratively, in part because until 1957 migrants could not freely sell or exchange land obtained from the state in the new territories (Machalek 2005).

3.3 Forced migrants from Galicia: a distinctive political identity

The historical experience of Poles in Austrian Galicia differed sharply from those of their brethren under Russian or Prussian control.² Poles of the Austro-Hungarian Empire practiced Catholicism freely; this was not the case for Poles in Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia. Polish children in the Austro-Hungarian Empire studied in Polish-language schools. Starting in 1869, courts and state administration used Polish. In 1870-71, the leading Galician universities adopted Polish as the language of instruction. In contrast, in Prussian and Russian empires, the use of Polish in administration and education was limited and, periodically, banned (Davies 2005). Furthermore, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the first to introduce representative institutions and to allow self-governance. Galicia had an elected legislature where Poles predominated; Poles also held senior positions in the provincial executive. In Prussia and Russia, Poles were largely denied access to positions in regional government, and opportunities to vote for Polish candidates or parties were severely curtailed or altogether absent (Taylor 1948).

There is a scholarly consensus that Poles of Galicia developed a highly pronounced political identity as a result of the historical distinctiveness of Austrian rule in Galicia.³ Today, Poles who

²A map of the final post-1815 partition boundaries is available in Appendix Figure A.2.

³The studies referenced in this section are of Poles from western Galicia – the territory west of the Curzon line where the Polish population was not subject to forced resettlement after WWII.

reside in what used to be Austrian Galicia tend to be more religious and conservative and more patriotic and nationalist by comparison to Poles in former Prussian and Russian partitions (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Zarycki 2015; Bartkowski 2003; Bukowski 2018). Galician Poles are also more active politically and more likely to turn out in elections and to support democracy as a form of government (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Bukowski 2018). To this day, the Austrian partition is described as the most "nationally developed" and "democratically mature" part of Poland (Zarycki 2015, 111). At the same time, research suggests that there is no difference in income, industrial production, education, corruption, and institutional trust at the former border between Austrian and Russian partitions (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015).

4 Hypothesis

In this paper, we aim to find out whether the distinctive Galician political identity is more present today in villages that had been settled mostly by migrants from Galicia in comparison to villages where resettlers from Galicia are in a minority. Simply put, are majority Galician villages more patriotic, religious, and politically engaged today than minority Galician villages? This is a test of the hypothesis, rooted in theoretical work in biology, psychology, and economics, which posits that persistence of communities facilitates the preservation and transmission of cultural identities and norms associated with these communities (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Bisin and Verdier 2001).

5 Research design

5.1 Survey sampling strategy

To test this hypothesis, we built a dataset of the historical composition of villages in Silesia, southwestern Poland, on the basis of archival documents and secondary sources from the 1940s. The roster of resettled villages is as complete and precise as the imperfect historical record allows. For instance, in one Silesian province (Opole), we located information on migrants' exact places of

origin for two-thirds of all the settlements.⁴ More information on how the roster was constructed can be found in Appendix 2.

We then randomly sampled 33 villages dominated by forced migrants from western Ukraine and 33 villages dominated by voluntary migrants from Central Poland, where migrants from western Ukraine composed a minority at the end of the resettlement process.⁵ In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to these two types of villages as majority and minority. A majority village is one where migrants from Galicia made up over 60% of the total population. Minority villages are those where Galician migrants were less than 40% of the total population.⁶

We then sent enumerators to interview descendants of forced migrants from western Ukraine in each of the selected settlements. Enumerators were instructed to locate at random ten respondents in every village whose families moved from Ukraine in the wake of WWII. Silesian villages are of roughly similar size, and we aimed to maximize the number of respondents and the number of communities while minimizing costs. In both types of communities, only the descendants of forced migrants from western Ukraine were interviewed, as we were interested in persistence of political identities specifically in this group. It turned out to be difficult to locate enough descendants of forced migrants in several minority settlements, and, in one majority village, the village head did not permit the survey to proceed. As a result, the survey was completed in 32 majority and 29 minority villages. These are mapped in the southwestern quadrant of Figure 2.⁷ Overall, 310 respondents were interviewed in majority villages and 293 in minority villages for the total of 603 second- or third-generation descendants of resettled Galician Poles.⁸ The survey was completed in

⁴The indigenous population, not subject to population transfers, dominated the remaining settlements.

⁵Towns and cities were excluded because of high mobility.


⁶We interviewed village elites (mayor, priest, teacher) to confirm the origin of the families in each sampled village. The correlation between elite reports and our historical data is high ($r = 0.73$), especially since some local elites are relatively recent transplants or are young. Close correspondence between historical data and contemporary estimates also suggests low population mobility in the countryside.

⁷Minority villages are slightly clustered to the north, and we explain the reasons for this and, in Appendix 2, discuss why we are not concerned about this clustering.

⁸Enumerators fell short of locating ten descendants of forced migrants from western Ukraine

fall 2016.⁹

Figure 2: Sampled settlements in Silesia (western Poland) and respondents' settlements of origin (western Ukraine).



in several majority villages, which is why there are only 310 respondents in majority settlements and not 320.

⁹Response rates were high by the standards of public opinion work in Europe at over 70%.

5.2 Pre-treatment balance

A major challenge to our claim of quasi-random assignment of migrants to majority and minority communities is self-sorting into specific settlements. For instance, Poles from especially religious or patriotic settlements might have made a special effort to band with like-minded settlers in villages where migrants from Galicia were in majority. Had this been the case, then evidence of contemporary differences in political identities between majority and minority communities would be due to self-selection and not because of the preservation or weakening of Galician community bonds as we hypothesize.

Historical accounts of the resettlement process suggest self-sorting was unlikely, though not impossible. To evaluate this concern systematically we collected historical data on the nature of settlements from which forced migrants originated and test for the possibility that migrants from specific settlement types systematically ended up in majority or minority communities. We also collected data on destination settlements in 1939 and examine whether there might have been systematic economic differences between majority and minority villages prior to their resettlement.

Migrants' settlements of origin in the Soviet Union are plotted in the southeastern quadrant of Figure 2. These are based on survey respondents' self-reports of birthplaces of maternal and paternal grandparents.¹⁰ Eighty-six percent of the origin settlements are in eastern Galicia; the remaining settlements are in the formerly Russian imperial region of Volhynia. The symbols on the map indicate whether residents of that settlement resettled to a majority village in western Poland (triangle), a minority village (arrow), or were scattered across two different village types (star). There is no obvious pattern of clustering by village type.

We compare the ethnic composition and voting behavior in the different types of origin settlements in Table 1.¹¹ Data on origin settlements' ethnic composition come from the 1921 Polish

¹⁰Recall rates about grandparents' places of birth were high. About 75% of respondents knew the names of settlements where their grandparents had been born. There were no systematic differences in recall rates between respondents in majority and minority communities.

¹¹Settlements of origin for migrants in both majority and minority villages are included in both columns.

Table 1: Balance on Pre-Resettlement Covariates in Settlements of Origin. Two-tailed T-tests.

	<i>Majority migration</i>	<i>Minority migration</i>	<i>Difference of means</i>
<i>Population census (1921)</i>			
Mean population	5566 (20769)	6756 (21725)	1190 (2827)
Share male	0.48 (0.02)	0.48 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Share Catholic	0.47 (0.29)	0.43 (0.30)	0.03 (0.04)
Share Jewish	0.15 (0.21)	0.20 (0.25)	0.05 (0.03)
Share Polish	0.57 (0.29)	0.57 (0.01)	0.01 (0.04)
Share Ukrainian	0.30 (0.27)	0.27 (0.26)	0.03 (0.04)
N	118	108	
<i>Election results in 1928 (lower house)</i>			
Turnout	0.75 (0.11)	0.74 (0.11)	0.00 (0.02)
Share BBWR	0.33 (0.20)	0.38 (0.21)	0.04 (0.03)
Share PPS	0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.00 (0.01)
Share BNM	0.20 (0.18)	0.18 (0.17)	0.01 (0.03)
Share Katol. Narod	0.08 (0.12)	0.10 (0.13)	0.02 (0.03)
Share Lewica	0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
N	43-95	38-88	
<i>Election results in 1922 (lower house)</i>			
Turnout	0.54 (0.20)	0.57 (0.17)	0.03 (0.03)
Share PSL "Piast"	0.40 (0.32)	0.39 (0.34)	0.00 (0.06)
Share PPS	0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	0.00 (0.01)
Share Bund	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.00)
Share Christian Union	0.23 (0.20)	0.21 (0.17)	0.02 (0.03)
N	74-91	64-85	

*Note: We provide data for all the major parties that ran candidates across multiple districts in the region of Galicia. N is lower for electoral data because voting results were only reported for settlements with over 500 voters and because parties did not run in all districts. Coefficients are group means; standard deviations and errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

census, the only interwar census with settlement-level data for Galicia.¹² Electoral data are for the 1922 and 1928 legislative elections; these were the only free and fair elections in interwar Poland (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018). Origin settlements are very similar in population size, ethnic and religious composition, and voting behavior. Galician settlements that gave rise to majority villages had slightly lower mean share of Jewish population (5%), but this difference does not reach statistical significance. The sample size for electoral outcomes fluctuates depending on a party, but all differences in party vote shares are not only statistically insignificant, but also substantively small. Turnout, the variable on which we hypothesize differences in minority and majority villages, was measured for all settlements with at least 500 voters and is nearly identical across the two types of origin settlements. Overall, the data are consistent with the project’s foundational assumption that migrants from western Ukraine who settled in majority and minority villages originated from very similar settlements.

We also collected information about economic conditions in migrants’ destination villages in western Poland from the last pre-WWII German census of 1939. These data are reported in Table 2. Prior to population transfers, the villages that would be settled, in a few years’ time, by different proportions of forced and voluntary migrants are nearly identical in size and economic structure. Once again, the differences across the majority and minority villages are negligible in magnitude and do not reach statistical significance.

6 Results

6.1 Main findings

At the center of our research strategy is the hypothesis that historical political traits associated with Austrian imperial rule in Poland – religiosity, patriotism, and political participation – will be a lot more likely to persist in communities where migrants from western Ukraine dominate. We test this hypothesis in Table 3 by inquiring whether survey respondents in majority villages are today more

¹²For Volhynia, census data is available only at the level of communes (an aggregation of several villages).

Table 2: Balance on Pre-Resettlement Characteristics of Destination Villages in Western Poland. Two-tailed T-tests.

	<i>Minority communities</i>	<i>Minority communities</i>	<i>Difference in means</i>
Number of inhabitants in 1939	607 (374)	594 (352)	13 (93)
Share employed in agriculture	0.56 (0.13)	0.59 (0.14)	0.03 (0.04)
Share employed in industry	0.22 (0.1)	0.21 (0.1)	0.01 (0.02)
Small farms (<5 hectares), share	0.38 (0.17)	0.39 (0.18)	0.01 (0.04)
Large farms (>20 hectares), share	0.17 (0.13)	0.16 (0.16)	0.01 (0.04)
Distance to railway, meters (1946)	3164 (2028)	2548 (1813)	616 (495)
N	32	29	

*Note: Coefficients are group means. Standard deviations/errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

religious, patriotic, and politically engaged than their counterparts in minority villages.¹³

There are two models for each dependent variable: a bivariate model that includes only a dummy for residence in a majority village against the baseline of living in a minority village and a full model with controls. The fully-specified model includes a pretreatment control for settlement population size in 1939 (an index that runs from 1 to 4 in increments of 300) and controls for gender and age from the survey. The models exclude post-treatment variables such as settlement size in the present, income and education levels, and the number of village institutions (church, school, library, fire brigade, etc.) because these variables might themselves be a product of variation in the resettlement dynamics.¹⁴ In Appendix Table A.1 we present the results of balance tests on these post-treatment variables across the two village types. We find no significant differences in institutional density, education, monetary indicator of income, or village size, though minority settlements have slightly larger populations in the present. As a matter of empirics, descendants of

¹³The total number of survey respondents is 603. The number of observations in this and subsequent tables is lower and varies by model because some respondents did not answer some of the survey questions that go into constructing the variables.

¹⁴The coefficients are smaller, but broadly similar when these post-treatment controls are included, as shown in Appendix Table A.6.

migrants from Galicia on average make up 62% of the population in majority settlements and 30% in minority villages.

Table 3: Persistence of Galician Political Identity in Majority Communities. Dependent Variables are Factored Indices.

	Religiosity		Patriotism		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Majority communities	0.26*	0.26*	0.61***	0.61***	0.24*	0.23*
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Settlement size in 1939		-0.05		0.05		0.17**
		(0.05)		(0.09)		(0.05)
Female		0.25**		-0.10		-0.21*
		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)
Age, yrs.		0.03**		-0.01		0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)
Age ²		0.00		0.00		-0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	-0.18*	-1.62***	-0.36*	-0.37	-0.14	-0.88*
	(0.08)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.43)	(0.09)	(0.35)
Observations	567	567	508	508	522	522
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.26	0.08	0.11	0.01	0.05


*Note: Standard errors clustered at the settlement level. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$*

The dependent variables are factored indices. Detailed description of these and subsequent factored indices is in Appendix 3. In brief, the religiosity index captures how often the respondent prays, attends religious services, and listens to religious radio programming. The patriotism measure combines responses to questions about one's level of pride in being Polish and belief in the importance of supporting the Polish government irrespective of its policies. The voter turnout index, a proxy for political participation, is a combination of answers to questions about actual turnout in the most recent presidential election (2015) and turnout in a hypothetical upcoming parliamentary election. The estimation technique is OLS, and standard errors are clustered at settlement level. We also reran these and subsequent analyses using hierarchical models, as respondents are nested within settlements. The results, reported in Appendix Table A.2, are very similar to OLS.

Consistent with expectations, the residents of majority villages are today more religious and patriotic. They are also more likely to turn out to vote than their peers in minority settlements. The

size of these coefficients is difficult to interpret from the table, as dependent variables are factored indices and are therefore on different scales. We visualize the magnitude of the effects in terms of changes in standard deviation in the dependent variables in Figure 3 using fully specified models (2, 4, and 6) from Table 3. Those in majority communities are more religious by 0.25 of a standard deviation and more likely to turn out in elections by 0.22 of a standard deviation. The effects of living in a majority community on patriotism are by far the largest, amounting to an increase equivalent to 0.58 of a standard deviation.

Figure 3: Effect of living in a majority village on religiosity, patriotism, and turnout as change in standard deviation from minority village baseline.



Note: 95% confidence intervals and point estimates based on Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 3.

Nineteen percent of our respondents were born into couples where one parent is from Austrian Galicia and the other from Russian Volhynia. Another 15% were born into Volhynia-only couples. In Appendix Table A.3, we examine whether cultural traits associated with Austrian rule are more strongly expressed once we exclude respondents of Volhynian ancestry. In this subsample, the coefficients on *Majority communities* in all models remain statistically significant at the 0.05

level or lower and increase in magnitude. This analysis again suggests that families, as passive repositories of historically-rooted identities and norms, need to be embedded within like-minded communities in order to successfully transmit their cultural code. It also confirms that there is something uniquely Galician about the political identities we are exploring, as they are expressed more strongly among respondents who have both maternal and paternal grandparents from Galicia.


We have now established that the core Galician political identities are more likely to survive in villages where migrants from Galicia are in majority. Does the persistence of these identities matter for electoral choices of respondents? To address this question, we explore respondents' partisan preferences as well as their beliefs about the political relevance of religion. We measure party preferences using a factored index that combines reported vote for the candidate from the conservative and nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS) in the 2015 presidential election and potential vote for PiS in a hypothetical upcoming parliamentary election. Relevance of religion to politics is captured via a factored index that combines respondents' opinions about the relevance of the Catholic Church to individuals' moral needs, problems of family life, and social problems facing Poland. The results of analyses modeled in the same way as those in Table 3 are reported in Appendix Table A.4. We find no effect of being in a majority community on voting behavior. This is consistent with Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), who found that Galician Poles do not consistently vote only for PiS, and that PiS and its primary competitor (Civic Platform) split the Galician vote. However, we do find that those in majority villages are considerably more likely to view the Catholic Church as being relevant to politics than their counterparts in minority settlements.

6.2 Placebo tests

Though different on the primary markers of Galician political identities (religiosity, patriotism, and political participation), respondents in majority and minority communities are indistinguishable on important political attitudes and behaviors that are not associated with the history of Austrian rule. In particular, respondents in both types of settlements have similar levels of interpersonal trust (trust in neighbors and strangers), institutional trust (church, police, parliament, and government),

trust in foreign governments (EU, Germany, Russia, Ukraine), and anti-Semitism (agreement with the statement that Jews are secretly in charge of Polish politics and economics). We plot differences on these variables across the two community types as changes in standard deviation in Figure 4; the underlying regression results that are modeled in the same way as analyses in Table 3 are reported in Appendix Table A.5.

Figure 4: Placebo tests: effect of living in a majority village on interpersonal and institutional trust, trust in foreign leaders, and anti-Semitism.



Note: 95% confidence intervals and point estimates based on Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Table A.5.

6.3 Comparison to a western Galician baseline

Further evidence that differences between majority and minority villages resulted from differential persistence of Galician political identities comes from a comparison of these two settlement types to the villages immediately west of the post-1945 Polish-Ukrainian border (see Appendix Figure A.3). The latter villages were in the same institutional environment until 1945, yet their Polish residents were not subject to resettlement and therefore in a better position to preserve Gali-

cian political identities. The settlements of western Galicia – in the contemporary Polish province of Podkarpackie – provide us with a comparison group of Galician Poles who stayed put against the two groups of Galician Poles from eastern Galicia who were resettled to western Poland and wound up either in majority or in minority in their new communities.

These settlements are not a perfect comparison group. Ethnically mixed communities in western Galicia that are similar to most settlements in eastern Galicia were subject to large population movements during the Holocaust as well as after WWII, including the forced removal of ethnic Ukrainians and an influx of Poles from other parts of the country. To maximize our chances of finding respondents of Galician origin, we picked ten villages (for the total of 100 respondents) at random from a list of settlements that experienced *least* displacement because they were dominated by ethnic Poles prior to WWII. By focusing on settlements that were predominantly Polish we ended up with a comparison group that is historically more conservative, religious, and homogeneous than most settlements east of the Polish-Ukrainian border, from which forced migrants in Silesia originated. This biases *against* finding similarities in the present between the settlements in Podkarpackie and majority settlements in Silesia.

Our expectation is that eastern Galician respondents in majority villages should be more similar to western Galician respondents in Podkarpackie settlements than respondents in minority villages when it comes to religiosity, patriotism, and political participation. In other words, respondents in minority villages should be considerably less religious, patriotic, and politically engaged than respondents in both majority and Podkarpackie settlements. To test this proposition, we re-ran the analyses from Table 3 with villages west of the Ukrainian border as a reference group and dummies for both majority and minority villages as the key explanatory variables.

The results are reported in Table 4. Consistent with expectations, in the bivariate estimation (Model 1), Podkarpackie and majority Silesian villages are statistically similar in levels of religiosity, while respondents in minority settlements are considerably less religious. In fully-specified Model 2, respondents in both majority and minority villages differ from the villages in western Galicia; however, the drop in religiosity relative to Podkarpackie villages is nearly twice as large

Table 4: Comparison of Resettled Migrants to the Western Galicia Baseline.

	Religiosity		Patriotism		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Majority communities	-0.20 (0.11)	-0.40*** (0.11)	0.03 (0.13)	0.05 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.20)	0.12 (0.21)
Minority communities	-0.47*** (0.12)	-0.66*** (0.11)	-0.58** (0.20)	-0.56** (0.19)	-0.26 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.21)
Settlement size before WWII		-0.06 (0.05)		0.04 (0.09)		0.15** (0.05)
Female		0.27*** (0.07)		-0.10 (0.08)		-0.20** (0.07)
Age, yrs.		0.02* (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)		0.03* (0.01)
Age ²		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
Constant	0.28** (0.09)	-0.77** (0.27)	0.22 (0.12)	0.17 (0.43)	0.12 (0.19)	-0.90* (0.37)
Observations	663	663	590	590	612	612
Adjusted R ²	0.03	0.26	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.05

*Note: Settlement size is measured for 1939 in treated villages and in 1921 for Podkarpackie villages due to data availability. Standard errors are clustered at the settlement level * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$*

in minority than in majority villages. As predicted, levels of patriotism are statistically indistinguishable for respondents in Podkarpackie and majority Silesian villages, whereas patriotism levels are considerably lower in the minority villages (Models 3-4). There are no statistically significant differences between Podkarpackie settlements and majority/minority villages on turnout (Models 5-6). This is contrary to our initial expectations, but it does bear noting that, in substantive terms, turnout in minority villages is much lower than both in Podkarpackie and majority Silesian settlements. Overall, the comparison of majority/minority communities to villages in southwest Poland is consistent with expectations. The descendants of forced migrants from western Ukraine in majority communities appear either to share the primary markers of Galician political identity with the comparison group of western Galicians who never moved or exhibit these markers to a greater extent than the descendants of forced migrants from the same region in minority villages.

6.4 Mechanisms behind the community effect

The preponderance of evidence suggests that the Galician political identity is more likely to be preserved in villages where migrants from Galicia are in a majority. The implication is that communities of like-minded families facilitate the transmission of political identities carried passively within individual family units. But what are the mechanisms by which this process occurs? Do majority villages have a denser network of local organizations or, perhaps, more frequent contacts between neighbors and friends? Or is some other mechanism at play?

This study was not designed to directly test the mechanism by which preservation of community bonds enables persistence of political identities. However, the survey results and the historical record provide some suggestive evidence. As mentioned earlier (Appendix Table A.1), majority and minority villages do not differ in the type and density of local organizations; they have a similar number of churches, schools, libraries, village clubs, volunteer fire brigades, and hobby associations. This allows us to rule out the institutional channel behind the persistence of Galician identities. In Table 5, we test whether the density of social ties varies across the two village types (Models 1 and 2). Our main dependent variable is a village integration factored index, which combines responses about the frequency of attendance at meetings, interest groups, get-togethers with friends, and joint work with others on improvements to the settlement. Respondents in majority and minority villages report similar levels of integration in village life: the coefficient on *Majority communities* is substantively small and statistically insignificant.

And yet, even though the institutional environment is the same across both village types and social contacts seem equally frequent, the substantive nature of interactions between family units is different. This is shown in Models 3 and 4 of Table 5, which suggest that respondents in majority villages are considerably less individualistic – by half a standard deviation - than their counterparts in minority settlements. The level of individualism is measured via a factored index that aggregates respondents' opinions about the importance of individual responsibility for one's wellbeing, and the benefits of competition, unregulated markets, and private ownership of business and industry. Higher values indicate greater individualism.

Table 5: Testing for Mechanisms Behind Community Effects.

	Village integration		Individualism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Majority communities	0.03 (0.15)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.49** (0.15)	-0.48** (0.15)
Settlement size in 1939		0.01 (0.07)		0.02 (0.07)
Female		-0.11 (0.07)		-0.06 (0.08)
Age, yrs.		0.01 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)
Age ²		-0.00* (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.01 (0.11)	0.22 (0.43)	0.27* (0.13)	1.10** (0.38)
Observations	562	562	544	544
Adjusted R ²	-0.00	0.08	0.05	0.09
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01			

It seems that while those residing in majority villages interact within the framework of the *same* formal institutions and with *similar* frequency as those in minority villages, the substance of their interactions differs. This makes intuitive sense. By virtue of the numeric dominance of Galician descendants, the members of this group are more likely to follow group norms (markers of Galician political identity) and to resist the temptation to adopt cultural traits associated with other groups. This is because deviation from the norms of the Galician group carries a significant risk of punishment by or ostracism from the majority group. It is also simply easier to preserve norms and patterns of behavior when many others in the community publicly exhibit these traits.

There is support for this proposition in the historical record. During the Communist period, norms relating to religiosity were reinforced in majority villages through participation in rituals that are particular to the Galician community. These include regular June and May prayers under the village cross, rosary prayers in fraternities, midnight masses, and indulgences (Pawłowska 1968, 150, 187). For instance, in the majority village of Dziadowa Kłoda, migrants from Galicia asked the priest to assign church pews based on region of origin and did not attend funerals or weddings of migrants from other parts of Poland (Hołubecka-Zielnicowa 1970, 66). Preserving higher levels

of religiosity, patriotism, and political participation was as simple as finding oneself in a reference community of peers from Galicia. In the words of Genowefa Kruk (n.d.) – a migrant from Galicia interviewed in Siedlce – "Here... the majority of people came from Obertyn, Dolina, and Stryj [three Galician settlements], so all of our traditions were simply transported here. Nothing has changed... What we did there, we do here." In contrast, in a minority village, even pressure from parents to uphold Galician practices was insufficient to prevent children from embracing non-Galician majority norms. For instance, Michał Sobków, a son of Galician migrants residing in a minority village, recalled how his mother failed to convince his sisters to wear headscarves, a practice that was common in the mother's Galician village. Very quickly this practice disappeared entirely in Sobków's village (Maciorowski 2011, 15).

7 Conclusion

Leveraging a natural experiment of history that divided a homogeneous population between different types of communities in a quasi-random fashion – some where Polish migrants from Galicia dominated and others where they constituted a minority – allowed us to test the role that community plays in the transmission of historically-rooted identities and norms. We presented evidence suggesting that respondents in majority and minority settlements are very similar on a set of economic and material variables and that the primary differences between them fall along the markers of the historical Galician political identity. Our main finding is that community composition is of crucial importance to the persistence of historical identities. Where Poles from Galicia were a majority after resettlement to western Poland, political norms associated with Austrian imperial rule – religiosity, patriotism, and political participation – persisted. In settlements where Poles from Galicia were a minority, these historical identities are considerably weaker today. We also explored possible mechanisms behind the community effect, although this requires further study.

Our finding suggests that while families are the carriers of historically-rooted identities and norms, families must be embedded within like-minded communities, where the majority shares the common identity, for identities and norms to have a high likelihood of persisting across multi-

ple generations. If dominant community culture is different, then identities carried by a handful of families will likely be weakened and eventually superseded by the majority's culture. It is a matter for further research whether families might be capable of transmitting certain types of norms on their own in the absence of support from like-minded communities. It seems reasonable to conjecture that identities that do not require public validation – perhaps certain types of religious or gender norms – might not need community support to persist. Another question for future work is how big a reference community has to be to sustain a group's political identity. This is also connected to the issue of the half-life of political identities and whether larger reference communities might be able to sustain historical identities for longer.

Empirically, this study speaks to conditions under which political identity persistence is likely. Political identities are unlikely to persist once community bonds are broken apart either because of naturally occurring long-distance economic or social mobility or as a result of forced resettlement. By the same token, historical political identities are perhaps less likely to persist in cities than in the countryside. Our findings also contribute to the study of assimilation processes, suggesting, consistent with common perceptions, that migrant assimilation might fail if migrants are settled compactly with other migrant families from their community of origin.

This study offers an important theoretical correction to the way we think about the transmission of political identities and norms in what has become a burgeoning field of scientific inquiry. Most studies of historical legacies either leave the mechanisms of transmission underspecified or, by default, presume that the family is the dominant channel. In fact, it would seem that communities might be more important than the family for the transmission of at least some political attitudes and behaviors. An advantage of refocusing attention away from families and toward community structures is that the role of communities in the transmission of historical identities is easier to study. In many instances, there are quality historical data on population mobility and community composition, which allow researchers to trace the mechanisms behind the intergenerational persistence of identities. This is no simple task – for one, we still need a theory of what a community is and which actors within it are pivotal and why. Yet this type of mechanism tracing must be done,

in the authors' opinion, in order to advance the fledgling research agenda on historical legacies. This research agenda might be heading toward an impasse as the number of studies demonstrating correlations between historical antecedents and contemporary outcomes is growing, while the causal mechanisms needed to render these associations credible remain elusive. It is our hope that this study has contributed in some way to the study of the mechanisms of identity persistence.

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Online Appendix

1 Additional Figures

Figure A.1: Main railway routes used for population transfers from the USSR to the formerly German territories, 1945.




Figure A.2: Historical Divisions of Poland.




Figure A.3: Map of villages populated by Galician migrants (majority and minority) in western Poland and non-resettled villages west of the Curzon line.



2 Establishing historical composition of villages

Determining the historical composition of Silesian villages was a challenge. The search for historical data on post-WWII settlement patterns in Silesia first took us to a highly detailed set of data on village histories in the contemporary province (*województwo*) of Opole, collected by Elżbieta Dworzak and Małgorzata Goc (2011). This study uses the origins of migrant families as reported in the protocols of property transfers (*protokoły przekazania gospodarstw*), detailing who took possession of German property that had become available, and from local registers of settlers (*rejestrzy osiedlonych*). The property protocols and settler registers ordinarily contain information on the place of origin prior to resettlement for each head of the household.

These data cover 625 villages, approximately two-thirds of all the settlements in Opole and almost all the villages with any migrants from anywhere outside of the voivodeship. We verified Dworzak and Goc's (2011) data against less-detailed ethnographic records from 1977 compiled by Rauziński and Zagórska (2007). The latter source covers 938 villages in Opole voivodeship (99% of the total) but contains data only on the share of migrants at the village level, essentially aggregating population into two groups: migrants (forced and voluntary) and the indigenous residents (*autochtoni*). This source allowed us to verify that most of the villages missing from the dataset compiled by Dworzak and Goc contained no migrants from western Ukraine.

To locate additional minority villages, we supplemented the information from Dworzak and Goc (2011) with archival data on the composition of southernmost municipalities in Dolnośląskie voivodeship, also in Silesia. The archival data from Dolnośląskie province come from the records of Starostwa Powiatowe in the 1940s, preserved in Archiwum Państwowy in Wrocław. Of course, these documents are not always complete but, to the best of our knowledge, they are the most detailed historical sources on post-WWII village composition in Silesia.

Using information on migrants' places of origin in these sources, we calculated the proportion of migrants in a given village who relocated from western Ukraine as opposed to other parts of Poland. We then narrowed our sample to the villages where migrants from Ukraine made up a clear majority or minority and where the rest of the population migrated from the territories of the Russian partition located in post-1945 Poland, to hold constant the identities of migrants' new neighbors. We then randomly sampled 33 majority and minority villages from this dataset.

As shown in Figure 2 in the body of the paper, there is a bit of clustering among minority communities, some of which are located slightly northwest of majority villages. This is because migration proceeded from east to west, so migrants from Galicia arrived to easternmost Silesian destinations first and continued to be settled there until housing capacity was exceeded. As a result, there are more minority Galician villages in Dolnośląskie province than in Opole province. An additional reason for the clustering is that village-level data for Dolnośląskie were available only for some counties. However, the distance between the cluster of majority communities in Opole and a similar cluster of minority communities in Dolnośląskie is only about 40 km, and both sets of villages are located in very similar agricultural terrain. Given what we know about the process of resettlement, the relative proximity of the two sets of villages, and similarities between northern Opole and southern Dolnośląskie voivodeships, both in the historical region of Silesia, this type of clustering does not present a problem for our research design.

3 Survey questions

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Female: “Respondent’s gender.” (0) Male; (1) Female.

Age: “What is the year of your birth?” Year of birth.

Education: “What is your education level?” (1) Incomplete primary; (2) Elementary, unfinished middle; (3) Gymnasium; (4) General middle (school or technical school); (5) Special middle (technical institute, college); (6) Professional technical; (7) Incomplete higher; (8) Higher.

Income, categorical: “How would you describe your household’s economic situation over the past six months from the options below?” (1) We don’t have enough money for food; (2) We have enough money for food and basic clothes; (3) We can afford food and clothes, but it would be difficult to buy a new electrical appliance, like a television; (4) We can afford all of the above and have enough money to travel abroad on vacation; (5) We can do all of the above but it would be difficult to buy a new car; (6) We do not experience any financial limitations.

Income, monetary: “Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in monthly. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.” (1) Less than 800 Zł; (2) 801- 1500 Zł; (3) 1501-2000 Zł; (4) 2,001 - 3,000 Zł; (5) 3,001 - 4,000 Zł; (6) 4,001 - 5,000 Zł; (7) More than 5,001 Zł.

Both parents from Galicia: “Where did the father’s side of your family live before World War II? And where did the mother’s side live before World War II? (a) Mother’s side, (b) Father’s side.” (1) Kresy Wschodnie (Ukraina → Lwów, Tarnopol, Stanisławów); (2) Kresy Wschodnie (Ukraina → Wołyń); (3) ANY other region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Religiosity: “Please tell me how often you: (a) Pray, (b) Go to Church, (c) Listen to religious programs on the radio.” (1) More than twice weekly; (2) Weekly; (3) On major holidays; (4) Never. Factored index.¹⁵

Patriotism: “Please tell me whether you AGREE or DISAGREE with each of these: One must support one’s country irrespective of what the government does.” (0) Disagree; (1) Agree. “Some people are very proud of being Polish; others less so. How proud are you of being a Pole on a 10-point scale where 0 is not at all proud and 10 is extremely proud?” (0) Not at all proud; (1); (2); (3); (4); (5) Neither proud, nor not; (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Extremely proud. Factored index.¹⁶

¹⁵Eigenvalue = 2.13, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76. The factor loadings are Pray = 0.89, Church=0.89, Listen to religious program = 0.73.

¹⁶Eigenvalue = 1.27, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.18. The factor loadings are Support=0.80,

Turnout: “Did you vote in the 2015 presidential election?” (0) No, I did not vote; (1) Yes, I voted. “If a parliamentary election took place this Sunday, would you vote?” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.¹⁷

Relevance of religion: “I will now read a few statements. Please tell me whether you AGREE or DISAGREE with each of these: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office.” (0) Disagree; (1) Agree. “Generally speaking, do you think that the Church in Poland is giving adequate answers to: (a) The moral problems and needs of the individual, (b) The problems of family life, (c) The social problems facing our country today.” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.¹⁸

Vote for PiS: “Whom did you vote for?” (1) Bronislaw Komorowski (PO); (2) Andrzej Duda (PiS); (3) Pawel Kukiz; (4) Magdalena Ogorek; (5) Janusz Korwin-Mikke; (6) Adam Jarubas; (7) Spoilt ballot. “Which political party would you vote for?” (1) PO; (2) PiS; (3) PSL; (4) SLD; (5) KORWiN; (6) Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru; (7) Kukiz 15; (8) Partia Razem; (9) Stonoga Partia Polska. Factored index.¹⁹

Individualism: “On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?” (a) (1) Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. (b) (1) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people. (c) (1) The state should give more freedom to firms; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) The state should control firms more effectively. (d) (1) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. Factored index.²⁰

Integration in Village Life: “In the past twelve months, how often have you... (a) attended a meeting in your village to discuss local matters; (b) attended a club/choir or some other interest group meeting in your village; (c) had friends from the village over to your house; (d) worked with other people in your village to fix or improve something.” Response options: (1) At least once a week; (2) At least once a month; (3) At least once a year; (4) Never. Factored Index.²¹

Interpersonal Trust: Question 1: “To what extent do you trust people from the following groups:

Proud=0.80.

¹⁷Eigenvalue = 1.69, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80. The factor loadings are Did you vote= 0.92, Would you vote =0.92.

¹⁸Eigenvalue = 2.48, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89. The factor loadings are Moral problem = 0.91, Family life problem =0.93, Social problem=0.88.

¹⁹Eigenvalue = 1.73, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80. The factor loadings are Whom did you vote for = 0.93, Would you vote for = 0.93.

²⁰Eigenvalue = 2.32, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74. The factor loadings are Responsibility=0.72, Competition=0.79, Freedom = 0.77, Private ownership = 0.76.

²¹Eigenvalue = 2.24, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71. The factor loadings are Meetings = 0.78, Interest groups = 0.82, Friends over = 0.57, Worked with others = 0.79.

(a) Your neighbors; (b) People you meet for the first time; (c) People of another religion; (d) People of another nationality." Options: Trust Completely (5); Trust Somewhat (4); Neither Trust nor Distrust (3); Distrust Somewhat (2); Distrust Completely (1). Question 2: "Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? How would you place your view on the scale on this card?" Options: (1) Most people would try to take advantage of me; (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) Most people would try to be fair. Factored index.²²

Trust in Domestic Institutions: "How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions and organizations? Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2), or none at all (1)?" List of institutions: (a) Church; (b) Police; (c) Parliament; (d) Government. Factored Index.²³

Trust in Foreign States and Leaders: "How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions and organizations? Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2), or none at all (1)?" (a) the European Union; (b) German government (under Merkel); (c) Russian government (under Putin); (d) Ukrainian government (under Poroshenko). Factored index.²⁴

Anti-Semitism: "Some say that Jews are still secretly in charge of Polish politics and economics. Others disagree. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?" Completely agree (4); Somewhat agree (3); Somewhat disagree (2); Completely disagree (1).

*Village Institutions:*²⁵ "Does your village have any of the following organizations? PLEASE SELECT ALL ANSWER OPTIONS THAT APPLY: (a) Church; (b) Club; (c) Volunteer Fire Brigade (OSP); (d) Agricultural circle; (e) A sports group (football team, etc.); (f) A hobby group (association of hunters, etc.); (g) Other [WRITE IN]." Additive index.

²²Eigenvalue = 2.75, Cronbach's alpha = 0.67. The factor loadings are Neighbors = 0.58, People met first time = 0.82, People of different religion = 0.88, People of other nationality = 0.86, Trust in others scale = 0.48.

²³Eigenvalue = 2.09, Cronbach's alpha = 0.67. The factor loadings are Church = 0.58, Police = 0.60, Parliament = 0.84, Government = 0.83.

²⁴Eigenvalue = 2.32, Cronbach's alpha = 0.72. The factor loadings are EU = 0.63, Germany = 0.82, Russia = 0.77, Ukraine = 0.82.

²⁵Only village elites were asked this question.

4 Post-treatment balance

Table A.1: Balance on Post-Resettlement Covariates Between Majority and Minority Communities.

	<i>Majority communities</i>	<i>Minority communities</i>	<i>Difference of means</i>
	mean (sd)	mean (sd)	diff (se)
<i>From the 1948 Polish census:</i>			
Autochtony, %	0.12 (0.20)	0.14 (0.30)	0.02 (0.07)
Migrants from Central Poland, %	0.26 (0.15)	0.56 (0.28)	0.30** (0.06)
Number of inhabitants in 2011	424.5 (270.73)	593.59 (544.26)	169.09 (108.50)
Institutional density in 2016 (index: 0-6)	3.44 (1.50)	3.35 (1.87)	0.09 (0.46)
N (settlements)	32	23-29	
<i>From the survey:</i>			
Female, %	0.57 (0.03)	0.60 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)
Age, yrs.	53.00 (17.97)	52.46 (17.78)	0.53 (1.46)
Education (index: 1-8)	4.65 (1.65)	4.64 (1.77)	0.01 (0.14)
Income, categorical (index: 1-6)	2.76 (1.07)	3.04 (1.19)	0.27** (0.10)
Income, monetary (index: 1-7)	2.77 (1.19)	2.68 (1.45)	0.09 (0.13)
Both parents from Galicia, %	0.61 (0.49)	0.58 (0.49)	0.03 (0.04)
N (respondents)	233-310	215-293	

Note: Two-tailed t-tests or proportion tests (for binary *Female*). Coefficients are group means. Standard deviations and standard errors are in parentheses. Number of respondents varies by survey question. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

5 Robustness checks and additional regression analyses

Table A.2: Hierarchical models replicating analysis in Table 3 in the paper. Individual-level variables are Female and Age.

	Religiosity		Patriotism		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Majority communities	0.25*	0.23*	0.59**	0.59**	0.23*	0.23*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Settlement size in 1939		-0.05		0.08		0.16**
		(0.05)		(0.09)		(0.06)
Female		0.25**		-0.11		-0.22*
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.09)
Age, yrs.		0.03*		-0.01		0.02
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Age ²		0.0000		0.0002		-0.0002
		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)
Constant	-0.17*	-1.69**	-0.31**	-0.53	-0.13	-0.89*
	(0.07)	(0.32)	(0.12)	(0.38)	(0.08)	(0.36)
Observations	567	567	508	508	522	522
Log Likelihood	-828.36	-757.34	-682.52	-687.47	-743.18	-749.55
AIC	1,664.71	1,530.68	1,373.05	1,390.93	1,494.36	1,515.10
BIC	1,682.07	1,565.40	1,389.97	1,424.77	1,511.39	1,549.16

Note:

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Persistence of Galician political identities among the offspring of Galicia-only couples.

	Religiosity		Patriotism		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Majority communities	0.31*	0.31*	0.81***	0.80***	0.32**	0.31**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Settlement size in 1939		-0.01		0.01		0.15*
		(0.05)		(0.09)		(0.07)
Female		0.29**		-0.11		-0.14
		(0.09)		(0.12)		(0.12)
Age, yrs.		0.02		-0.01		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age ²		0.00		0.00		-0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	-0.01	-1.56**	-0.35*	-0.23	-0.20*	-0.79
	(0.11)	(0.49)	(0.16)	(0.54)	(0.09)	(0.51)
Observations	344	344	296	296	315	315
Adjusted R ²	0.022	0.269	0.182	0.205	0.022	0.048

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.4: PiS vote and relevance of religion to politics.

	Church Relevance		PiS Vote	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Majority communities	0.37*	0.36**	0.08	0.05
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Settlement size in 1939		-0.11		-0.02
		(0.07)		(0.09)
Female		-0.04		-0.36**
		(0.09)		(0.13)
Age, yrs.		0.01		0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)
Age ²		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	-0.28*	-0.77	-0.13	-0.93
	(0.11)	(0.40)	(0.13)	(0.48)
Observations	458	458	248	248
Adjusted R ²	0.028	0.135	-0.003	0.134

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A.5: Placebo test: Differences in interpersonal and institutional trust, trust in foreign leaders, and anti-Semitism.

	Interpersonal Trust		Trust in Domestic Institutions		Trust in Foreign Governments		Anti-Semitism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Majority communities	0.01 (0.16)	0.01 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.14)
Settlement size in 1939		0.03 (0.08)		-0.03 (0.05)		0.02 (0.08)		-0.05 (0.06)
Female		-0.04 (0.08)		0.08 (0.10)		0.13 (0.11)		-0.19 (0.13)
Age, yrs.		-0.05*** (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)
Age ²		0.00*** (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.03 (0.10)	1.05** (0.36)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.27 (0.40)	0.10 (0.12)	0.37 (0.53)	2.32*** (0.10)	1.66*** (0.37)
Observations	564	564	499	499	445	445	328	328
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	0.012	0.002	0.083	0.000	0.020	-0.003	0.025

Note:

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.6: Differences in political attitudes and voting behavior across different types of migrant communities with contemporary controls.

	Religiosity (1)	Patriotism (2)	Turnout (3)	Church Relevance (4)	PiS vote (5)
Majority communities	0.18 (0.11)	0.53** (0.16)	0.21* (0.10)	0.26* (0.13)	-0.08 (0.17)
Both parents from Galicia	0.23* (0.09)	0.23 (0.13)	0.06 (0.09)	0.49*** (0.10)	0.14 (0.17)
Settlement size in 1939	-0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.09)	0.15** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)
Female	0.30*** (0.07)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.18* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.32* (0.13)
Age, yrs.	0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Age ²	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Income (index: 1-6)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.14 (0.07)
Education (index: 1-8)	0.00 (0.03)	0.10* (0.05)	0.08* (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
Constant	-1.30*** (0.37)	-0.57 (0.48)	-1.49** (0.43)	-0.21 (0.51)	-0.72 (0.57)
Observations	516	452	469	418	226
Adjusted R ²	0.288	0.125	0.073	0.213	0.135

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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